Hamid belonged to the select group who earn their leadership positions in life through their wisdom and ability to rise above and work through conflicts and differences. He showed a blend of qualities: a perfectionist, an idealist and a pragmatist. He was endowed with strong faith and values, and expec ted as much from all those who worked with him. He had great moral courage and personal integrity.
Hamid will be dearly missed by his wife Barbara, his children Hossein, Nassrin and Reza, as well as his many friends around the world. It appears self-evident that psychiatry should be classified as a particular specialty within the broader field of medicine. Psychiatrists, being first and foremost doctors, have undertaken an identical basic training to their physician and surgical peers and, as in general medicine and surgery, the biomedical model is a central pillar of psychiatric practice. Within psychiatry, signs and symptoms are elicited, diagnoses made and very often physical interventions (in the form of psychotropic agents) are employed. however, familiar institutional conventions can conceal the fact that psychiatry suffers from greater uncertainty regarding its conceptual foundations than other fields of medicine. In fact, the conceptual challenges arising within psychiatry are reflected in its thriving field of philosophy, and although there exists a dedicated philosophy of medicine, no other specialty is equal to psychiatry's breadth of conceptual debate.
Guest editOrial
Fulford (1998) has discussed psychiatry's tendency to encompass a greater divergence in values than other specialties. Central to psychiatric theory and practice is the 'biopsychosocial' model. Ghaemi (2009, p. 4) expresses concern about the usefulness of this model, arguing that it 'devolves into mere eclecticism, passing for sophistication'. But this pronouncement on the model's failure may not indicate a fault with the model per se, but instead may merely highlight our limited understanding of the relations between its three domains. For psy chiatry, elucidating the nature of the relations within the 'biopsychosocial' model is a particularly pressing task.
Here we will consider two conceptual problems that pose deep questions regarding the nature, or ontology, of the phenomena with which psychiatry deals. These conceptual challenges are central to achieving greater intelligibility of the biopsychosocial model.
Medicine of the mind or brain?
Traditional psychiatry, like medicine generally, has a primary theoretical and practical focus on a particular system or part of the body, in this case the brain. However, in addition to attending to the body, psychiatry is equally concerned with the 'mind'. This means that a central issue for psychiatry is understanding the nature of the (psycho-bio) relationship between mind and body. This so-called 'mind-body problem' unfolds from the simple observation that conscious experience involves experiential properties, such as feeling warm or nauseous, smelling roses or hearing middle C. However, when scientifically investigating the body, or specifically the brain, we describe instead the physical properties of neuronal activation states, neurotransmitters, receptor binding and so on. The seemingly irreconcilable differences between the manifest properties of mind versus the properties of physical objects famously led the philos opher Descartes to the dualist conclusion that there are two distinct 'substances' -the mind and the body -that interact via the pineal gland.
Chalmers (2003) provides an overview of proposed philosophical solutions to this problem, including: several versions of mind-brain identity
